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I. INTRODUCTION
According with the postulate impossible trinity, freely floating exchange rate will be 
adapted by a country which adapts freely foreign exchange system and independent monetary 
policy. Indonesia is one of country that adapts it. By freely floating exchange rate and position 
as a small open economy, Indonesia’s exchange rate movement is strongly influenced by capital 
flows moreover in the short run. In foreign exchange market, capital flows is a reaction of foreign-
exchange players to buy or sell foreign exchange. Foreign-exchange player can be categorized 
in two groups. First group called fundamentalists, buy or sell foreign exchange based on their 
expectation of future exchange rate with regard to fundamental economic condition. The 
other group called chartist, buy or sell foreign exchange based on their expectation on future 
exchange rate with regard to previous exchange-rate behavior. These two groups determine 
market exchange-rate as reflected by interaction of supply and demand of foreign exchange. 
Sometimes, the exchange rate moves beyond their fundamental value. Hence, existence of 
central bank’s. Foreign-exchange intervention policy is needed to drive the exchange rate back 
to its long-run fundamental value. The main results in the empirical literature (Almekinders and 
Sylvester, 1996; Frenkel, 2004; Ito and Yabu, 2007; and in papers of surveys Neely and Weller, 
2001) suggest that foreign-exchange intervention policy tend to be conducted in order to reduce 
exchange rate misalignment or to reduce foreign exchange undesired fluctuations.
Foreign-exchange interventions by the central bank could be categorized in two parts. 
Firstly, a foreign-exchange intervention (non-sterilized) occurs when a monetary authority buys 
(sells) foreign exchange which affect the monetary base, interest rates, market expectations 
and intimately the exchange rate. Secondly, foreign-exchange intervention is said sterilized if 
the monetary authority offsets or sterilizes the effect of the foreign exchange operation on 
the monetary base by selling or buying domestic bonds in order to keep the monetary policy 
unchanged.
With the central bank policy, the exchange rates would hopefully stay in the desired level 
and its stability can be ensured. Nevertheless, beside relying on central bank policy to stabilize 
the exchange rate, financial agents are sometimes actively hedging the exchange rate in order to 
avoid losses due to exchange rate fluctuations. Röthig, Semmler, and Flaschel (2005) argued that 
the negative effect of exchange rate on the balance sheet can be eliminated by risk management 
like hedging. Hedging generally conducts by forward transactions, swaps, NDF etc.
In this part of paper, the behavior of microstructure of foreign exchange market players 
(fundamentalists and chartists) in determining exchange rate is investigated. This approach is 
hopefully able to overcome the failure of numerous empirical studies based on the asset market 
approach of exchange rate to explain short term movements of exchange rate (Lewis, 1995 
and Taylor, 1995. This paper adopts the exchange-rate microstructure approach called ‘noise 
trading’ channel pioneered by Hung (1997) and the coordination channel Reitz and Taylor 
(2008), and Taylor (2004), (2005). Ahrens and Reitz (2003) perform empirical study regarding 
199Foreign Exchange Expectations in Indonesia: Regime Switching Chartists & Fundamentalists Approach
to this issue and their result provide evidence that the heterogeneous expectations exchange 
rate model is able to explain daily German-US forward rates. Further research by Maatoug, 
Fatnassi, Omri (2010) finds that both regimes (fundamentalists and chartists) are persistent in 
Australia. However he finds that the fundamentalists regime is riskier and when the RBA was 
not active in the foreign exchange, the fundamentalists were disappeared. Other study using 
marcov switching approach by Brunetti, Mariano, Scotti (2007) in Southeast Asia, finds that 
real effective exchange rates, money supply, stock index returns, are important variables to 
identify turbulence and ordinary periods. 
To investigate different forecasting strategies by the players, the impact of central bank 
intervention is investigated applying a heterogeneous expectations exchange rate model. The 
approach is also evaluated by including central bank intervention policy to drive exchange 
rate to its long-run fundamental value. Foreign-exchange interventions would allow foreign-
exchange intervention to influence the both forecasting rules of chartists and fundamentalists, 
thereby altering the proportion of the two groups in the foreign exchange market. A central 
bank intervening in the foreign exchange market is considered effective if the exchange rate is 
driving closer to its fundamental value. Generally, foreign-exchange intervention may as well 
improve the performance of expectations based on fundamentals, especially when central 
banks try to correct current exchange rate misalignments. Following Frankel and Froot (1986) 
the excess demand/supply for foreign currency is assumed to be a function of the relative 
success of chartist and fundamentalist forecasting techniques. At the end, it is suggested that 
the performance of chartist or fundamentalist exchange-rate expectation is expected to be 
improved by central bank intervention. 
This research furthermore re-examines the effects of foreign-exchange intervention on 
exchange rate volatility within the heterogeneous groups in the foreign exchange market. These 
studies suggested two new channels through which sterilized intervention may be transmitted: 
the noise trading channel (Hung, 1997) assuming two hypotheses: noise traders will determine 
exchange rate by flow market equilibrium and the central bank should intervene in highly volatile 
market periods and keep its interventions secret (Reitz, 2002). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the theory and 
literature study, followed by Research Methodology in section3. Our main empirical results 
concerning intervention effectiveness are reported in section 4, before the final section (5) 
concludes.
II. THEORY
2.1. Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure
In macro perspective, foreign exchange level should reflect the fundamental economy 
condition. As described so far, the determinants of the exchange rate like inflation, productivity, 
interest rate, etc categorized as fundamental factors which significantly affect long-run exchange-
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rate. Furthermore, news related to the fundamental factors such as statistic announcements of 
money supplies, trade balances, or fiscal policies is received by the market, and the exchange 
rates will also change to reflect this news. However, there is also significant issue regarding 
foreign-exchange microstructure which also determine exchange rates. Understanding the 
“market microstructure” allows us to explain the evolution of the foreign exchange rate, in 
which foreign exchange traders adjust their foreign-exchange purchase or sale based on their 
own rules. In addition to macroeconomic indicators news, there also exists private information 
from which some traders know more than others about the current state of the market. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, exchange rate is determined by two groups according to different 
approaches of expectations; the fundamental analysis and the chartist analysis. The classification 
was proposed previously by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990), and has been enhanced among 
others by Ahrens and Reitz (2003), Reitz (2002), Westerhoff (2003), Wieland and Westerhoff 
(2005). In this diagram, the market exchange-rate is built by combining fundamentalists and 
chartists exchange-rate expectation adjusted by their own proportion in the foreign-exchange 
market. In the period of misaligned exchange-rate from desired value, central bank will enter 
the market to re-adjust the exchange rate to its desired level or mitigate the short-term 
fluctuations.
Diagram 1. 
Fundamentalist-Chartist FX Expectation Mechanism
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2.2. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies
Global financial market has been pushing emerging countries financial market also more 
integrated to the global financial market. As return of assets offered is often higher than ones 
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in advanced financial market, the asset return including exchange rate is moving with more 
fluctuates. This condition is not accepted by most central banks as it will ignite more uncertainty 
in their financial market. There are some reasons behind that such as, first, large movements 
in the real exchange rate away from medium-run equilibrium are costly, and second, there is 
imperfect capital mobility/asset substitutability. To overcome this phenomenon, most central 
banks in emerging market economies implement various monetary policies. The most popular 
ones are sterilized intervention and short-term policy rate. This opens up the fortuitous possibility 
that policy makers may be operating in a two-target, two-instrument world. In this note, this 
research re-examines the case for using two policy instruments (the policy interest rate and FX 
market intervention) under an IT regime in Indonesia’s financial market. Hence, a central bank 
indeed implements two instruments (the policy interest rate and FX intervention).
Lesson learned from previous financial crises, push central banks to maintain stable 
consumer prices if they are to achieve sustained and stable growth. Therefore, the central banks 
need more policies than just the policy interest rate such as foreign-exchange interventions. 
Lesson learned from previous financial crises, central banks should maintain stable consumer 
prices as well as promote sustainable growth in order to avoid the financial crises. Therefore, 
the central banks need more policies than just the policy interest rate such as foreign-exchange 
interventions. One more important think is the central bank should also maintain financial 
sector stability including stable exchange-rate and healthy domestic financial institutions in 
micro perspective. Regarding to exchange rate, the central bank should avoid possible large 
deviations of the exchange rate from its medium-run equilibrium, even in an inflation target 
which requires floating exchange-rate system. The undesired exchange rate fluctuations might 
be response shortly by foreign-exchange intervention, if it moves persistently. Response to 
such changes can deliver better economic outcomes under ITF which requires free-floating 
exchange-rate system (but in some reason, a measured foreign-exchange intervention to drive 
the exchange rate in line with desired inflation, cannot be neglected) than being neglect of 
the exchange rate (Stone, Roger, Shimizu, Nordstrom, Kisinbay, Restrepo, 2009). Furthermore, 
in some cases, the exchange-rate moves very volatile persistently then it should be minimized 
with additional monetary policies beyond exchange-rate intervention. In this regard, interest 
rate policy may be powerful to support exchange rate stability as well as price stability in order 
to achieve sustainable economic growth.
2.3. The Foreign Exchange Market and Purposes of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Volatility in foreign exchange rates can disrupt domestic economy through deteriorating 
imports and exports performance, decreasing cross-border investment and funding, and 
threaten the stability of domestic prices through changes in prices for imported or exported 
goods (passed-through power of exchange rate to inflation). As a result, this could affect the 
domestic economy and even the economies of trading partners abroad. Therefore, the monetary 
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authority even with ITF should manage the exchange rate to support the achievement of domestic 
price stability and domestic economy by applying monetary policies such as foreign exchange 
intervention. While many central banks objectives are to set the optimal level of foreign-exchange 
that support price stability achievement as well as to mitigate exchange-rate volatility, however, 
others prefer to limit exchange rate volatility rather than to meet a specific target for the level 
of the exchange rate. Beyond on that, most central banks admit that domestic interest is still 
the main reason why they enter the foreign-exchange market in a sustained basis. For example 
as summarized in BIS publication (2006), major emerging central banks in Asia perform selling 
intervention to halt the continuing their currency appreciation between the end of 2001 and 
the end of 2004. As a consequence, global foreign exchange reserves grew by over US$1600 
billion, reflecting reserve accumulation by emerging market economies. This phenomenon 
shows the emerging central banks was actively enter the foreign exchange market to avoid 
their undesired appreciation of their currencies as it would harm their export competitiveness/
domestic economy.
On the other hand, some central banks have different views on exchange rate. They 
conversely prefer to stay behind from the foreign exchange intervention such as few developed 
countries have actively intervened within the last decade. There are some reasons behind 
that decision. One of them suggests foreign exchange intervention policy is not good for 
the economy where unbalances exist. Letting the exchange rate fluctuate freely is a sign of 
economic rebalancing is working. In this case, the dynamics of the exchange rate is a functioned 
as automatic stabilizer for the economy. This argument is elaborated in the studies by Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000) which concludes the foreign exchange intervention is a kind of fear of 
floating phenomenon. BIS (2006) summarizes reasons why developed countries no longer 
actively intervene foreign-exchange market. BIS suggest that the instrument is only effective if 
regarded as additional policy interest rate. Another reason implied that large-scale intervention 
can undermine the stance of monetary policy independence. The last reason is that private 
financial markets have enough capacity to absorb and manage shocks - so let the market 
determine the exchange rate. 
There are many economists are interested to see the effectiveness of exchange rate 
intervention which conducted by central bank due to stabilize the exchange rate. However, 
there are also the differences about the view of exchange rate intervention affectivity to stabilize 
the exchange rate. Taylor (2004) examines the effectiveness of exchange rate intervention 
by using Markov switching model applied to dollar-mark data for the period 1985-98. In his 
conclusion, Taylor shows that the intervention increase the probability of stability when the 
rate is misaligned, and that its influence grows with the degree of misalignment. However, 
intervention within a small neighborhood of equilibrium will result in a greater probability of 
instability. Beine, Grauwe, and Grimaldi (2009) investigated the effect of sterilized intervention 
in a noise trading channel with two states Markov switching model. Using biweekly data, they 
found that interventions increase the weight of fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market 
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and therefore exert stabilizing influence on the exchange rate. The fundamentalist behavior 
tends to stabilize the market while the presence of chartists may cause destabilization. Other 
study by Dominguez (1998) explored the effect of foreign exchange intervention by the G-3 
central banks (US, German, and Japanese) on the behavior of exchange rates over the 1977-
1994 period. The results indicate that intervention operations generally increase exchange rate 
volatility. 
2.4. Foreign Exchange Market Microstructure and Foreign Exchange Intervention
Within microstructure approach, exchange-rate behavior is investigated. As discussed 
previously, the microstructure approach of exchange rate studies suggested two new channels 
through which sterilized intervention may be transmitted. In this regards, foreign-exchange 
intervention influence the expectations of foreign-exchange traders which are defined as 
fundamentalist and chartists. In this case, Frankel and Froot (1988) developed a model 
incorporate both players which is used to forecast the exchange rate expectations by them. 
The fundamentalist approach forecasts exchange rate expectation by the fundamentalists 
based upon economic fundamentals, whereas the chartist approach forecasts exchange-rate 
expectation by chartists based upon the past behavior of the exchange rate. Furthermore, this 
model is developed by Vigfusson (1996) by implementing the Markov regime-switching model, in 
which explains the Chartist and Fundamentalists (C&F). He also suggests that using MA chartist 
model appears to do much better the AR chartist model. In this approach there are two rules in 
which two forecasting equations of both chartist and fundamentalist set up to estimate foreign 
exchange expectations. In each equation, C&F model placed the time-varying weight. 
The further research from Reitz (2002) is about the usage of C&F model to analyze 
the exchange rate behavior by the market players and also investigate the impact of foreign 
exchange intervention by central bank to the exchange rate expectations by the traders. 
Reitz propose a generalization of the noise trader transmission mechanism to examine the 
impact of central bank intervention on exchange rates. Within a heterogeneous expectations 
exchange rate model intervention operations are supposed to provide support to either chartist 
or fundamentalist forecasts, which forces portfolio managers to adjust their foreign currency 
positions. He test the model by applying daily US-dollar/DEM forward rates and intervention 
data of the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1992 in the model. He 
finds that the performance of simple chartist trading rules was strong whenever these central 
banks intervened on the foreign exchange market. Instead, the fundamentalists which use the 
fundamentalist technique has a worse estimation results.
In Australia, the RBA’s approach to foreign exchange market intervention has evolved 
since the float of the Australian dollar in 1983, as the Australian foreign exchange market has 
developed and market participants have become better equipped to manage their foreign 
exchange risk. Over time, foreign exchange market intervention has become much less frequent 
204 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Volume 17, Nomor 2, Oktober 2014
and more targeted towards addressing periods of market dysfunction. Obviously since 2008, 
the foreign exchange intervention by the RBA has been suspended.
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. The Chartist-Fundamentalist (C & F) Model Specification
In this part of paper, the market exchange rate of USD/IDR is built through the interaction 
of foreign-exchange demand-supply in domestic foreign-exchange market. The foreign-exchange 
supply and demand is set up by foreign-exchange market players transactions. In the foreign-
exchange market, the players can be categorized in two parts i.e. fundamentalist and chartist 
who have foreign-exchange expectations based on their own rule. Generally, chartists build their 
own foreign-exchange expectations using technical analysis rules to explore paste movements of 
exchange rate in the future. Meanwhile, fundamentalists build their exchange-rate expectations 
based on macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, interest rate, productivity, etc. Each of 
expectations are regarded as long-run equilibrium or steady state for each foreign-exchange 
players within their own regimes. 
The fundamentalist and chartist expects that market exchange rate will converge to its 
long-run or steady state rate within a specific period depending on the current deviation between 
market exchange-rate and the respected steady state value. In this research, basic model is 
adopted from Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010: 30-34) and Reitz (2002: 3-7). The exchange rate 
is built by interactions between foreign exchange market traders which is divided into 2 groups 
i.e fundamentalist and chartists. Fundamentalists forecasting rules and Chartists forecasting rules 
can be expressed, respectively, as follow: This paper applies the markov-switching approach on 
exchange rate expectation by fundamentalists and chartists in Indonesia as suggested by Reitz 
(2002). This paper will also augment the basic model with some contemporaneous variables 
beside exchange-rate return and exchange-rate intervention with other variables such as NDF 
return and CDS. These such augmented variables are used as they may have significant impact 
on exchange-rate behavior.
Within this specification as also suggested by Frankel and Froot (1986: 24–38), 
the exchange-rate S
t
 is driven by the decisions of foreign-exchange players (chartist and 
fundamentalist) to buy or sell foreign currency based on their expectation of future exchange-
rate changes and augment by a set of contemporaneous variables included in a vector zt. Hence, 
the model specification is written as:
(1)ݏ௧ ൌ Dܧ௧ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൅ Eݖ௧ 
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where the vector of elasticities of the contemporaneous variables (β) and the elasticity of 
exchange rate expectation (α) should be constant overtime. 
As proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986: 24–38), the market exchange rate return will 
be generated by the two players’ exchange rate expectations or a mixture of chartist ܧ௧௖ ቂൣݎ௧ାଵ൧ቃ 
and fundamentalist ୲୤ ቂൣ୲ାଵ൧ቃ forecasts:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
୲ ቂൣ୲ାଵ൧ቃ ൌ )୲୲ൣ୲୤ାଵ൧ ൅ ሺͳ െ)୲ሻ୲ሾ୲ାଵୡ ሿ 
The parameter Ft, denoting the weight given to fundamentalist views at date t, this 
expectation is dynamically updated by the fundamentalist in a rational Bayesian manner:
ȟ)୲ ൌ ߜሺ)୲ିଵכ െ)୲ିଵሻ 
With :
)୲ିଵכ ൌ  ௥೟ିா೟೎ሺ௥೟ሻா೟షభ೑ ሾ௥೟ሿିா೟షభ೎ ሾ௥೟ሿ 
Where Ft* is estimated weight given to group of fundamentalist when expecting future 
exchange rate. Meanwhile, the value of δ reflects the extent to which portfolio managers 
enclose new information from central bank intervention using adaptive process. Since portfolio 
managers always maintain a positive weight for both chartist and fundamentalist forecasts, ∆F 
has to be restricted so that F stays in the range between 0 and 1 reflected the portion of each 
group (fundamentalist and chartist) when determining exchange rate. Meanwhile, to optimize 
the weight assigned to fundamentalist, Lewis (1989: 79-100) assume fundamentalist forecasts 
exchange rate by means of a Bayesian learning process as follow:
)௧ ൌ )౪షభǤ)೑ሺ௥೟ȁா೟షభ೑ ሾ௥೟ሿሻఠ೟షభǤఝ೑ቀ௥೟ቚா೟షభ೑ ሾ௥೟ሿቁାఠ೟షభǤఝ೎ሺ௥೟ȁா೟షభ೎ ሾ௥೟ሿሻ 
Where ߮௖ሺݎ௧ȁܧ௧ିଵ௖ ሾݎ௧ሿሻ  and ߮௙൫ݎ௧หܧ௧ିଵ௙ ሾݎ௧ሿ൯ሻ is density function of foreign-exchange 
return r
t
 of chartist and fundamentalist, respectively. With regard to fundamentalist view, the 
market exchange-rate is assumed to revert to long-run fundamental equilibrium ݏ௧෥ , within a 
given speed θ over time depending on the current gap between current exchange-rate s
t
 and 
long-run fundamental exchange rate, i.e.: 
ܧ௧௙ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൌ ߠሺݏ௧෥ െ ݏ௧ሻ 
Meanwhile, regarding to chartist view, the market exchange-rate is assumed to revert 
to long-run chartist equilibrium ݏ௧෥ , within a given speed y over time depending on the current 
gap between current exchange-rate s
t
 and long-run chartist exchange rate ݏ௧෥ , i.e.: 
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(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
In this model, the market exchange rate is built by interactions between fundamentalist 
and chartists in foreign-exchange market. Each group of players believe that market exchange 
rate will equate to their own expectation in a specific period of time which is denoted by θ 
(a speed of adjustment of the market exchange-rate for fundamental rule) and y (a speed 
of adjustment of the market exchange-rate forchartist rule). Meanwhile, ݏ௧෥  is the long-run 
fundamental (chartist) exchange rate which is built based on economic indicator (previous) 
data behaviour by fundamentalist (chartist). According to fundamentalist, foreign-exchange 
expectation by the exchange-rate traders can be moved as distributed symmetrically around 
its fundamental value ݏ௧෥ . Although several researchers implement PPP as proxy of exchange-
rate fundamental value, this paper employs uncovered interest parity (UIP) as the long-run 
fundamental value ݏ௧෥ . The model above explains that market exchange-rate will converge to 
its fundamental value ݏ௧෥  in the long run. A study using PPP by Takagi (1991) provides evidence 
there is a valid relationship between market exchange-rate and fundamental exchange rate only 
in the long run implying low values for θ. This view is also supported by Taylor and Peel (2000) 
and Taylor (2001) showing that due to its nonlinear dynamics the exchange rate reverts to the 
PPP level, but only in the long run. Furthermore, PPP or UIP as a measure of the fundamental 
exchange rate e
t
 seems to be suitable for the investigation of central bank intervention, because 
monetary authorities have used it as a target level (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). 
As defined by Maatoug, Fatnassi, Omri (2010) this study specify two states of unobserved 
latent variables (fundamentalist and chartists regimes) to be incorporated in the model denoted 
by variable lt (lt = c for chartist regime lt = f for fundamentalists one). The state of regimes is 
parameterized as a first order Markov process and is driven by first-order transition probabilities 
which expressed as follow:
ܧ௧௖ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൌ \ሺݏ௧෥ െ ݏ௧ሻ 
݌ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺ݈௧ ൌ ݂ȁ݈௧ିଵ ൌ ݂ሻ 
ݍ ൌ ݌ݎ݋ܾሺ݈௧ ൌ ܿሃ݈௧ିଵ ൌ ܿሻ 
The transition probabilities between regimes (fundamentalist-chartist) are assumed to be 
constant over time. Fundamentalist transition probabilities (p) is the probability of exchange rate 
expectations will remain in the fundamentalist regime, and chartist exchange-rate expectation 
transition probabilities (q) for the chartist stay in the chartist regime which are described as 
follow:
݌ ൌ ͳ െ ሺͳ െ ݁ݔ݌ሺߨ଴ሻሻିଵ 
ݍ ൌ ͳ െ ͳ െ ሺͳ െ ݁ݔ݌ሺߢ଴ሻሻିଵ
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If market exchange rate does not converge to its fundamental value in the long run, 
central banks will enter the foreign exchange market. The efforts of the central banks on foreign 
exchange markets can be called effective, if the adjustment of the current exchange rate to its 
long run fundamental equilibrium is accelerated. 
3 . 2 .  T h e  F o r e i g n  E x c h a n g e  I n t e r v e n t i o n / M o n e t a r y  P o l i c y 
Augmented Regime-Switching-C&F Model :  RS-CF- Int -NDF-CDS
Reitz (2002) outlined exchange-rate expectation modeled using Markov switching 
approach both in the conditional mean and variance for both fundamentalists and chartists. 
Inspired by the model this paper defines the mean equation of the first regime represent the 
fundamentalist regime including the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value 
et describe by Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) as outlined above. UIP is chosen because it reflects 
the monetary policy instrument to achieve desired domestic price as well as to support sustainable 
economic growth. The mean specification model for fundamentalist is defined as follow:
(12)
(13)
(14)
ܧ௧௙ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൌ ߠሺܷܫ ௧ܲିଵ െ ݁௧ିଵ) 
This paper expands the original model by augmenting Foreign Exchange Intervention (I), 
Non-Delivery Forward (NDF) USD/IDR, and Credit Default Swap (CDS) rate variable to see the 
impact of foreign exchange intervention by the central bank, NDF and CDS to foreign exchange 
rate expectation by the market players (fundamentalists and chartists). In introducing foreign 
exchange intervention/monetary policy operations into the regime-switching framework, this 
research defines that the dummy variable It = 1, if the central bank intervenes (by foreign 
exchange intervention/monetary policy) at time t and It = 0, otherwise and rewrite the mean 
equations of the standard C&F model as follow:
ܧ௧௙ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൌ ]௧ሺܷܫ ௧ܲȂ݁௧ିଵሻ 
for fundamentalist augmented rule model, where
where  
This implies that the observed reversion of the exchange rate to PPP or UIP – denoted 
by ζt - is driven by fundamentalist speculation, central bank intervention, NDF rate and CDS 
rate. Denoting the influence of foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy by δθ, NDF by αθ 
and CDS by , this research can formulate ζt as a function of a 0,1- exchange rate intervention 
dummy, NDF
t
 and CDS
t
Meanwhile, Reitz (2002) defines the second regime’s mean equation contains chartist 
expectation. Chartists are foreign-exchange player who believe that current exchange rate will 
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move to its long-run average value measured by technical trading rules concerning previous 
exchange-rate behavior i.e. the moving average trading consisting of the differences between 
ma3 and ma200. Meaning that chartists are supposed to expect that a future exchange rate 
moves are predicted by the proportion y of the positive difference between the 3 day moving 
average (ma3) and 200 day moving average (ma200) and vice versa, in this case. Hence, chartist 
exchange rate expectation is defined as:
abcdefghijklmopθrstuvwxyz
ABCDEFGHIJKLMOPQRSTUVWXYZ
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
ܧ௧௖ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൌ ߰ሺ݉ܽଶ଴଴ǡ௧ െ ݉ܽଷǡ௧ሻ 
The variance of D et, i.e. the volatility of et is assumed to be constant within regimes, h0t 
=   and h1t =  thus the source of conditional heteroscedasticity is the regime switching 
behavior.
Generally, a central bank will conduct foreign-exchange interventions implementing a 
leaning against the wind-strategy to change the traders foreign-exchange expectation back to 
chartist long-run exchange rate average value of ma
200,t
. In this type of study, subsequent changes 
in noise trader’s positions magnify the initial impact of intervention operations, augmented 
by other significant variables such as NDF and CDS. Hence, the model specification can be 
rewritten as follows:
ܧ௧௖ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ ൌ K௧ሺ݉ܽଶ଴଴ǡ௧ െ ݉ܽଷǡ௧ሻ, 
This implies that a given trend in the exchange rate (h
t
) is due to chartist speculation, 
central bank intervention, augmented by other variables such as NDF and CDS rate. Denoting 
the influence of foreign exchange intervention/monetary policy by dy, NDF by ay and CDS by 
wy this research can formulate ηt as a0,1-intervention dummy It, NDFt and CDSt as follows:
where  
Clearly, if the foreign exchange intervention of the central bank had an impact on the 
forecasting performance of chartists and fundamentalists, a change of coefficients represented 
by significant estimates of the various d
I should be observed. By introducing intervention 
dummies, NDF rate, and CDS rate in the specification of second moment, the conditional 
variance becomes:
݄଴௧ ൌ ߪிଶ ൅ߜఙಷమǤ ܫ௧ ൅ߜఙಷమǤ ܰܦܨ௧ ൅ߜఙಷమǤ ܥܦܵ௧
for the fundamental regime, and
݄ଵ௧ ൌ ߪ௖ଶ ൅ߜఙ೎మǤ ܫ௧൅ߜఙ೎మǤ ܰܦܨ௧ ൅ ߜఙ೎మǤ ܥܦܵ௧
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for the chartist regime. Thus, this paper is able to re-examine the relationship between 
central bank intervention, NDF, CDS and exchange rate volatility.
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Data
The data are daily for the sample period 2006 – 2012. All variables are in logarithms except 
for the interest rate variables, which are in annual terms. The foreign variable is US Federal 
Funds Rate. The Indonesian variables are domestic o/n interbank interest rate, the underlying 
consumer price index, NDF USD/IDR Rate, CDS rate, the USD/IDR spot exchange rate, and foreign-
exchange intervention by BI. The microstructure of foreign exchange in Indonesia is still limited 
as few traders exist in foreign exchange market. Even though there are 72 foreign exchange 
banks in Indonesia, only about 22 to 38 banks actively trade in the foreign exchange market. 
However, Bank Indonesia state that the microstructure of the domestic foreign exchange market 
also influences the effectiveness of intervention. The net supplier of foreign exchange is still 
dominated by domestic state-owned banks, while foreign banks’ supply or demand depends on 
capital inflow/outflow. The volume of transactions tends to be larger during periods of heavy 
portfolio inflows. Most foreign-exchange transactions are spot accompanied by swap, although 
forward transactions are developing. There are counter-party transaction limits, especially for 
smaller banks. Foreign-exchange transactions must have underlying and are limited to domestic 
players only (Warjiyo, 2013).
4.2. Evidence of Exchange Rate Expectation & Central bank’s Intervention in 
Indonesia
The models described above were estimated by maximum likelihood. Parameter 
estimates were obtained using the BFGS algorithm, and the reported t-statistics are based on 
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors (White,1982). The estimates are derived from the 
daily USD/IDR spot exchange rate series kindly supplied by Bloomberg. The UIP was constructed 
using daily O/N Interbank rate of IDR and USD. The intervention dummy series is based 
on intervention data kindly provided from Bank Indonesia. The foreign exchange intervention 
series only includes active foreign-exchange interventions made by Bank Indonesia to influence 
foreign exchange rates. Foreign-exchange intervention by BI is reported whenever they changed 
their net foreign assets. The sample extends from January 2006 to June 2012. The series of 
the spot exchange rate, the UIP relation and the 200 day moving average are presented in 
upper graph, Bank Indonesia purchases and sales of Dollars against IDR can be seen as vertical 
graph in Figure 1.
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Figure 1.
USD/IDR spot rate,UIP, MA 200 and BI FX intervention
Source: author’s calculation
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Table 1 contains the estimates of the RS-CF, the RS-CF-INT, RS-CF-INT-NDF and RS-CF-
INT-NDF-CDS models. As regards the smoothed transition probabilities, the all models differ 
slightly at best. p and q range above 0.78 thereby indicating high persistence of regimes. The 
unconditional probability of the fundamentalist regimes ݌ҧ ൌ ଵି୯ଶି୮ି୯ is lower than the one assigned 
to chartist regimes for all respected models. This is also reflected in the expected duration of 
fundamentalist regime. In the RS-CF model (a), the (first) fundamentalist regimes (1 - p)-1 is 
expected to last up to 8.9 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes (1 - q)-1 have 
a longer duration of at least 14.5 trading days. Meanwhile, the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR 
expectation share is p about 38% smaller than the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation q (62%) in 
performing USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates of variances point to regime dependent 
heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the second regimes 
 in these conditional regimes is lower than the variance in the first regimes . The estimates 
of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients y and θ, are statistically significant and of the correct 
sign despite showing very low values meaning the market exchange rate will converge to their 
own steady-state value in the long run. These findings are supported by other study by Takagi 
(1991). He provides evidence there is a valid relationship between market exchange rate and 
fundamental exchange rate only in the long run implying low values for θ.
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In the RS-CF-INT model (b), the (first) fundamentalist regimes are expected to last up (1 - 
p)-1 to 9 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes (1 - q)-1 have a longer duration of at 
least 13.5 trading days. Even it is better that model (a) because of BI exchange rate intervention, 
the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share p is about 40% still smaller than the chartist 
rule USD/IDR expectation q (60%) in performing USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates 
of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low 
volatility: the variance in the second regimes  in these conditional regimes is still lower 
than the variance in the first regimes  even though for chartist it gets smaller variance. The 
estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients y and θ, are also statistically significant 
and of the correct sign.
Figure 2. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model”
Figure 3. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model augmented with FX Intervention”
In the RS-CF-INT-NDF model (c), the (first) fundamentalist regimes are expected to last 
up (1 - p)-1 to 5.4 trading days where as the (second) chartist regimes (1 - q)-1 have a longer 
duration of at least 9.4 trading days. Because of BI exchange rate intervention and NDF rate 
variable, the fundamentalist rule USD/IDR expectation share p decreases to about 37% which is 
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even smaller than the chartist rule USD/IDR expectation q (63%) in performing USD/IDR market 
rate. Significant estimates of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing 
periods of high and low volatility: the variance in the second regimes  in these conditional 
regimes is still lower than the variance in the first regimes  even though for chartist it gets 
smaller variance. The estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients y and θ, are also 
statistically significant and of the correct sign.
In the RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS model (d), the regime switching is getting faster than those 
in previous models meaning of increasing exchange rate uncertainty, the (first) fundamentalist 
regimes are expected to last up (1 - p)-1 to 3.8 trading days where as the (second) chartist 
regimes (1 - q)-1 have a longer duration of at least 6.8 trading days. Because of BI exchange 
rate intervention, augmented with NDF rate, and CDS 1mth variable, the fundamentalist rule 
USD/IDR expectation share p decreases to about 36% which is even smaller than the chartist 
rule USD/IDR expectation q (64%) in performing USD/IDR market rate. Significant estimates 
of variances point to regime dependent heteroscedasticity capturing periods of high and low 
volatility: the variance in the second regimes  in these conditional regimes is still lower 
than the variance in the first regimes  even though for chartist it gets smaller variance. The 
estimates of chartist and fundamentalist coefficients y and θ, are also statistically significant 
and of the correct sign.
Figure 4. Smoothed Probabilities “basic model augmented with FX Intervention & NDF”
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Figure 5. Smoothed Probabilities model augmented with FX Intervention & NDF & CDS”
Figure Smoothed Probabilities of USD/IDR in the basic model (a) no intervention, no 
NDF &CDS, (b) augmented with BI intervention, (c) augmented with BI intervention & NDF, (d) 
augmented with BI intervention, NDF, and CDS.
However, the most important results from these Markov switching procedures are 
significant parameter estimates of chartist and fundamentalist forecasting techniques within 
the heterogeneous expectations framework. As has been outlined in the theoretical section 
of the paper, central bank interventions are supposed to affect exchange rates by influencing 
chartist and fundamentalist forecasting success. Because the standard RS-CF model is nested 
in the more general RS-CF-INT-NDF-CDS model, the hypothesis can be examined by the values 
of the log-likelihood functions, the likelihood ratio test (LRT) statistic and the estimates of the 
various ds, as, ws, in table 1.
As the LRT statistic suggests, the consideration of intervention dummies, NDF, and CDS, 
explain a significant improvement in the log-likelihood function. Hence, the hypothesis that 
exchange rate expectations are not affected by central bank interventions, NDF, and CDS has to 
be rejected. Particularly, the results of parameter estimates give rise to the conclusion that foreign 
exchange activities of Bank Indonesia, NDF and CDS, could have supported fundamentalist 
and chartists rules. The dummy exchange-rate intervention coefficient δθ of the central bank is 
significant and reports a significant increase of z
t
 whenever It =1. In the case of addition of new 
variable ‘NDF’ and ‘CDS’, respectively the coefficient aθ of the central bank is still significant, 
while wθ is insignificant. However, totally the effect, reports a significance increase of zt, meaning 
that speed of adjustment to long-run/fundamental value is increasing when fundamentalists 
dominated the market and central banks intervene.
When looking at the link between central bank intervention, within chartist exchange rate 
expectations model, the (b) model recognizes insignificant decreasing change of h
t
 as δy  show 
negative value though insignificant. This implies that the adjustment of the exchange rate to 
its long run equilibrium has been decelerated in periods when chartists dominated the market 
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and central banks intervene. In the case of addition of new variable ‘NDF’ and ‘CDS’ to the 
chartist model as shown in (d) model, the coefficient ay and ߱ట are surprisingly significant and 
reports a significance increase of h
t
, meaning that speed of adjustment to its long-run value is 
increasing because of NDF and CDS (even though dy - decrease the speed of adjustment to its 
long run equilibrium in one hand when chartists dominated the foreign exchange market).
Regarding to volatility in relation with central bank’s FX Intervention, this research finds 
that this is confirmed by the finding that the FX intervention dummy (especially in fundamentalist 
regime) in the model RS_CF_INT, identified periods in which the volatility is a bit increase except 
in chartist regime which is not significant, as shown in Table 1. It has also same conclusion 
when using model (d), while model (c) reports contradiction. However, the result should be 
very careful before quickly concluding that exchange rate volatility increase in fundamental 
regime is due to intervention operations. Rising uncertainty of global financial condition which 
may ignite sudden and massive capital flows, disorderly markets, speculative transactions 
behaviour, may hamper central bank intervention policy. This is confirmed in a study by Baillie 
and Osterberg (1997a) that find evidence that foreign-exchange interventions by US, German, 
and Japanese central banks have tended to increase foreign-exchange volatility in the USD/JPY 
forward market when JPY/USD is under pressure. This is also supported by findings in a study 
by Giner and Mendoza (2005) which argues that foreign-exchange intervention appears to 
be effective in short time or the effectiveness will be short-lived. He also finds that the more 
frequently exchange-rate intervention applied by the central bank, the effectiveness would be 
smaller. In the case of Indonesia, the central bank enters the foreign exchange market almost 
every day, this might confirm why the volatility is conversely increased. Furthermore, excessive 
exchange-rate fluctuations might be found as another factor that halts Bank Indonesia effort 
to reach the effectiveness of foreign exchange market in driving exchange rate to its long-run 
fundamental or in achieving price stability condition. This phenomenon, making central bank 
intervention remains an ambiguous policy tool in influencing exchange rates.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous 
expectation exchange-rate model, is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists 
and fundamentalist regimes. It is shown that the two regimes are persistent. The estimates of 
chartist and fundamentalist coefficients y and θ, are statistically significant and of the correct 
sign despite showing very low values meaning the market exchange rate will converge to their 
own steady-state value in the long run. In the period investigated, chartist dominates in the 
exchange rate determination. As the LRT statistic suggest, the consideration of foreign-exchange 
intervention dummies explain a significant improvement in the log-likelihood function. Hence, 
the hypothesis that exchange rate expectations are not affected by central bank interventions 
has been rejected. Particularly, the result of parameter estimates give rise to the conclusion that 
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foreign exchange activities of BI could have supported fundamentalist (UIP) & chartist (Moving 
Average) trading rules but in opposite direction. The dummy BI FX interventions coefficient in 
the fundamentalist period dθ is positive whereas in the chartist period dy is negative; but only 
the coefficient of fundamentalist is highly significant in the complete model (d).
When looking at the link between BI FX intervention within both fundamentalist/chartist 
exchange rate expectations, this study recognizes very significant change of z
t
 and h
t
 but 
in opposite direction. This implies that the adjustment of the exchange rate to its long run 
(fundamental) equilibrium ‘UIP’ has been accelerated in the periods when fundamentalists 
dominated the market and central bank intervenes as it improve the performance of 
expectations based on fundamentals, especially when central banks try to correct current 
exchange rate misalignments. On the other hand, the adjustment of the exchange rate to its 
long run (fundamental/chartists equilibrium) has been decelerated in the periods when chartists 
dominated the market and central bank intervenes.
In the case of Indonesia, it is shown that the predictive power of fundamentalist forecasting 
techniques approximated by the deviation of the current exchange rate from the UIP level, were 
enhanced whenever the Bank Indonesia intervened on the foreign exchange market. There is 
evidence that within this framework, central bank operations on foreign exchange market has 
been called effective, as the adjustment of the exchange rate to its long run (fundamental) 
equilibrium is accelerated when fundamentalists dominated the market and central bank 
intervenes, not when chartists dominated the market. It means that the impact of central bank 
intervention on foreign exchange rates is only effective when assessed by means fundamentalist 
regime approaches. In this regards, Bank Indonesia’s foreign-exchange intervention has been 
able to drive the USD/IDR to long-run/fundamental ‘UIP’ as assumed in fundamentalist rule.
With regard to exchange-rate volatility, however, Bank Indonesia efforts to exert a 
stabilizing effect of foreign exchange interventions, the result still does not show what Bank 
Indonesia wants as the variance shows increasing value. Several factors such as external shocks 
and disorderly foreign exchange market which beyond Bank Indonesia control, may play 
significant role behind this findings.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATION
In this research, the effect of central bank intervention within a heterogeneous expectation 
exchange rate model is investigated. The results are supporting both chartists and fundamentalist 
regimes. In the period investigated, chartist dominates in the exchange rate determination. 
While BI foreign exchange intervention can push the market rate to its long-run fundamental 
equilibrium, however, Bank Indonesia’s effort to exert a stabilizing effect of foreign exchange 
interventions, the result does not show a success.
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As a policy implication, the central bank should pay attention more to the foreign-exchange 
market player, especially the fundamentalist and chartist as they have a significant role in 
determining market exchange rate. The central bank should drive exchange rate expectation to 
the fundamentalist’s rule as it is relevant with monetary objective in achieving targeted inflation. 
Furthermore, foreign-exchange intervention is proven effective when exchange rate expectation 
is dominated by fundamentalist. As consequence, the central bank should implement optimal 
monetary policy with appropriate strategy especially in determining optimal interest rate and 
exchange rate intervention as well as implement governance aspects of monetary policy.
For a small open economy like Indonesia, exchange rate movement does not always 
reflect fundamental value. Increasing USD/IDR exchange rate volatility often occurs as a result 
of rising uncertainty of global economic condition which ignites sudden massive capital flows, 
irrational behavior of market players, the microstructure conditions of the market, and offshore 
market influence.
As a policy implication, relying solely on Bank Indonesia’s interest rate policy to achieve 
the inflation target and maintain stability is not always sufficient. The central bank’s strategy is 
to include exchange rate policy in the monetary and macro-prudential policy in order to achieve 
its goal more effectively.
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